Computer network traffic is analyzed via mutual information techniques, implemented using linear and nonlinear canonical correlation analyses, with the specific objective of detecting UDP flooding attacks. NS simulation of HTTP, FTP and CBR traffic shows that flooding attacks are accompanied by a change of mutual information, either at the link being flooded or at another upstream or downstream link. This observation appears topology independent, as the technique is demonstrated on the so-called parking-lot topology, random 50-node topology, and 100-node transit-stub topology. This technique is also employ to detect UDP flooding with low false alarm rate on a backbone link. These results indicate that a change in mutual information provides a useful detection criterion when no other signature of the attack is available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attacks on the network have become commonplace and with them intrusion detection systems (IDS's), firewalls, virus scanning, and the like have become parts of an ever growing arsenal of defense tools [MVS01] , [Ken00] . If some knowledge of the nature of the attack is available, it would be easily recognizable by pattern recognition techniques. Hence, signaturebased IDS is perhaps the popular IDS technique [Pax99] , [Roe99] . However, when a new attack strikes, no such signature is available, in which case the only hope is through anomaly detection [SJJ02] , meaning detection of some deviation of the overall system behavior from what is considered normal. Anomaly detection can be host based or network based. Host based anomaly detection is at the end user level, while network based detection is at the level of network data. The present paper is relevant to the latter, in the sense that it detects intrusion by analysis of the signals at some link.
Within network-based anomaly detection, most techniques are count based where the rate of occurrence (i.e., the number of events in a time period) or the absolute value of some count are monitored. A sufficiently large deviation of the count from its nominal value is assumed to signify an attack. Change-point detection schemes such as cumsum [BN93] or exponentially weighted moving average may be used to detect when the deviation of the count occurs [WZS04] . For example, TCP-SYN attacks are detected by monitoring the arrival rate of TCP-SYN packets or the number of half-open connections (e.g., [SP04] ).
Email worms can be detected by monitoring the number of emails sent from a mail server and by examining the number of emails sent to certain classes of destinations [WBMW04] . The rate of DNS lookups [WKO05b] and ARP requests [WKO05a] are used to detect various types of worms. The arrival rate of certain sized UDP packets can be used to detect worms such as
Code Red (e.g. [MPR02] ).
The paper presents an alternative to count-based anomaly detection. More specifically, we investigate intrusion detection that is based on a possibly subtle change relevant to the dynamical structure of the signal. Arguably that single parameter that best encodes this dynamical structure is the order of the model of the observed time series. As already noted in [SBJ03] , this model order can be obtained by either the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Minimum Description Length (MDL) criterion.
The former is a Kullback-Leibler based criterion, while the latter is a Kolmogorov complexity based criterion [WD99] . A third avenue of approach utilizes the Kullback-Leibler information in a different way to produce the Akaike mutual information (MI) between past and future of the time series; model order selection is then viewed as a compromise between simplicity of the model and its ability to carry most of the mutual information; this is computationally implemented in stochastic balancing (see [?] and the references cited therein). The interrelation among these three approaches is depicted in Figure 1 . The left hand side of the diagram refers to properties of the statistics, whereas the right hand side refers to properties of sequences. 
where K(y(1), ..., y(n)) of the complexity of the sequence y(1), ..., y(n) and H(y(1), ..., y(n)) is the entropy of the probability distribution of y(1), ..., y(n). The other connection between complexity and mutual information, marked as a dotted line in Figure 1 , is more specific to intrusion detection and expanded upon in the next section.
The specific path taken in this paper is the extreme left of the diagram of Figure 1 , except that we stop short of detecting a change in model order, but rather endeavor to detect a change in mutual information.
A. Mutual Information versus Kolmogorov Complexity
Since the MI and Kolmogorov complexity both endeavor to find model order, the two approaches ought to be somehow related. To understand the similarities/discrepancies, some more formal concepts are already in order.
The mutual information between the past y − and the future y + is the amount by which the Shannon entropy of the future decreases when we are given the past, that is, H(y + ) − H(y + |y − ). Practically, the past/future MI is related to the (properly weighted) mean square error between the data and the optimal predictor model. In the Gaussian case, the modeling is traditionally done by the classical innovations representation [Aka75] , while, in the non-Gaussian case, the modeling could be done by such well known statistical modeling techniques as the Alternating Conditional Expectation (ACE) [BF85] .
The Kolmogorov complexity K(y) of a string y is the length of the shortest composite string < T : u > such that if the string u is the input tape to the Turing machine T it produces y on the output tape and then stops [Sip97, Def. latter to arbitrary shift dynamics T : Ω → Ω with invariant measure µ, it is convenient to use Markov partitioning Ω = ∪ i A i , so as to reduce the problem to symbolic dynamics. However, even after this conversion, the connection between complexity and mutual information does not appear to hold without the crucial φ-mixing condition, that is,¯µ
φ(k) for some decaying function φ(k), and uniformly for all n. For example, consider the automorphism of the torus y(k + 1) = F y(k) mod 1 =: T y(k), where F ∈ Z 2×2 and det F = ±1, in which case the entropy is relative to the Lebesgue measure µ [NS89] . This entropy is well known to be h(y + ) = log(|λ(F )| max ) and the decay rate of the correlation is given by φ(k) ∼ |λ(F )| −k max [BSTV97] . By the Zvonkin-Levin theorem, the Kolmogorov complexity rate is given by log(|λ(F )| max ). As the complexity increases, the correlation decreases faster, hence so does
as k → ∞, and from there on it can be shown [?] that the past/future mutual information P
B. Fundamental Concepts
A key assumption of the techniques investigated here is that some network attacks change the structure of the traffic. In an effort to understand self-similarity, several aspects of the structure of network traffic have been extensively investigated. It has been widely reported that various aspects of the network and traffic impact the structure. For example, the autocorrelation, more specifically, the rate of decay of the autocorrelation, has been widely used to study traffic [Sta98] . This rate of decay is related to the Hurst parameter and is known to be related to the application layer parameters such as file size distribution [CB96] .
In [FGW98] , a wavelet-based analysis of traffic revealed a cascade structure that is dependent on transport and application protocols as well as user behavior such as mouse clicks and session duration. While much of this previous work focuses on long time scales, in [LB03] , the short-time scale behavior of the "packet pattern" was studied and it was found that this pattern depends on certain network parameters such as loss rate. Here, the mutual information is used, but instead of examining the variation over different time scales to understand self-similarity or scaling, the temporal variation is used to understand the type of traffic, specifically, to determine whether an attack is occurring.
The premise of the information theoretic approach to intrusion detection is that any kind of intrusion would disturb the dynamical structure, and hence the information structure, which the signal inherits from the interaction of TCP with the malicious flow. For example, in case of constant bit-rate (CBR) UDP flooding, packet arrival rates may become more stable than those that occur under typical TCP file transfers. In this case, the signal becomes more deterministic, hence more predictable;
that is, CBR flood results in the past packet arrival rate holding more information about the future packet arrival rate. Next to CBR flooding, there are other attacks that would rather decrease the information, making the signal less predictable. It appears therefore that the traffic has to be monitored for a change in information, which should trigger the alarm. On the other hand, while flooding-based attacks may impact the mutual information, traffic anomalies that do not impact the dynamic structure would not cause a change in the mutual information. Other techniques are required to detect such attacks.
From a broader perspective, since as shown in the preceding section, the connection between rate of decay of correlation and mutual information does not appear to hold without a stronger version of mixing, it is believed that mutual information adds, next to rate of decay of correlation, a new dimension to traffic analysis.
C. Practical Implementation
Numerically, the mutual information between the past and the future of the traffic signal, or any process for that matter, is computed via Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) between the past and the future of the process [Aka75] , [JH85] . In case of a Gaussian process, the linear CCA is adequate in the sense that the mutual information can easily be computed from the linear Canonical Correlation Coefficients (CCC's). If the traffic signal is non-Gaussian, the linear CCC's underestimate the mutual information. However, after a nonlinear pre-processing, the resulting nonlinear CCC's would yield an estimate that approaches the mutual information as closely as possible, depending on the amount of nonlinear processing that is consistent with online intrusion detection.
Several signals (e.g., link utilization, packet arrival, and queue length) are candidates for mutual information analysis by canonical correlation. However, our experiments have shown that the change in mutual information concurrent with an attack is more sizable if the average utilization over a sample period is analyzed. Since the number of arrivals during a sample period and the average utilization during a sample period differ only by a scaling factor, the mutual information of the utilization is the same as the mutual information of the number of packet arrivals.
In Section IV, three topologies are analyzed here: parking lot topology, random 50-node topology, and 100-node transit-stub topology. We do not consider a widely used single-bottleneck dumbbell topology in this paper, as it was shown in [SBJ03] that intrusion detection on the dumbbell topology is straightforward. The random 50-node and the 100-node transit-stub topologies are generated by Georgia Tech's topology generator (Gt-Itm). We use the network simulator (ns) [htta] to integrate these topologies and to generate traffic. For each topology, our study is 2-fold: linear versus nonlinear canonical correlation analysis, for varying sampling periods (ranging from 0.1 to 20 sec.). Furthermore, in Section VI, this mutual information-based detection scheme is applied to backbone network traces.
While the simulation and experiment results are promising in that they indicate that the traffic anomalies result in a significant change in the mutual information, the results should not be taken as definitive proof of the deployability of mutual informationbased detection mechanisms. Rather, the intent of this paper is to illustrate the potential utility of signal processing techniques such as mutual information for the detection of network traffic anomalies. A comprehensive examination of the performance in terms of false positives and false negatives over the very wide range of types of traffic found in the Internet is currently under investigation.
D. Outline
An outline of the paper follows. Section II gives a brief overview of the related work in this area. Section III deals with the linear and nonlinear canonical correlation analyses, the mutual information, and the resulting models. Section IV presents the simulation setup. In Section V the simulation results are analyzed. [PCJ+02] . Perhaps the most relevant approach along the lines of our work is Kolmogorov complexity approach to intrusion detection described in [EBH01] . The fundamental difference between our work and this work is highlighted in the introduction.
II. RELATED WORK

III. CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Here {y(k) ∈ [−b, +b] : k = ..., −1, 0, +1, ...} is the centered link utilization signal (i.e., the total number of bytes that arrived during the sample period divided by the maximum possible number of bytes that could arrive during the sample period). y k is bounded by the bandwidth and is viewed as weakly stationary process with finite covariance E(y(i)y(j)) = Λ i−j defined over the probability space (Ω, A, µ). As such, there is no need to take infinite variance processes (for example, α-stable, H-self-similar processes [ST94] ) into consideration. The past and the future of the process are defined, respectively, as
where L is the "lag." We will drop the notation [L] whenever the size of the past or the future is irrelevant. The mutual information between the past and the future [JW92a] , [Wu92] , [Kul68] , [Aka75] is the amount of information we acquire about the future when we are given the past. Since, technically, the entropy of a continuous-valued process does not exist, the mutual information is most easily defined in terms of past-measurable partitions A and future-measurable partitions B of the sample space Ω,
In the above, H(A) is the entropy of the partitioning A and H(A|B) is the conditional entropy of the partitioning A given the partitioning B. The last equality in the above is valid only under absolute continuity conditions, in which case p (y − , y + ) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative µ(dy − ,dy + ) dy − dy + and p (y − ) , p (y + ) are the marginal densities. As such, I(y − , y + ) is the KullbackLeibler "distance" between p (y − , y + ) and p (y − ) p (y + ). In this setup, it could be argued that, because y(k) is a packet count under bandwidth limitation, it takes only finitely many values, so that the mutual information can still be defined as
, where H(y + ) is the entropy of the future and H(y + |y − ) is the conditional entropy of the future given the past.
A. Linear Canonical Correlation
The linear Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) is a second moment technique for computing the mutual information under the standard Gaussian assumption. Since the process y(k) is bounded, the Gauss property is only an approximation of the true distribution.
Factor the covariances of the past and the future as
and then construct the canonical correlation matrix Γ along with its Singular Value Decomposition (SVD),
where U, V are orthogonal matrices and
The σ's are called Canonical Correlation Coefficients (CCC's). Since they are all bounded by 1, it follows that, even as L → ∞, the canonical correlation operator is bounded as kΓk ≤ 1, where k·k denotes the spectral norm. If the process is Gaussian, it is well known that
The fact that Γ is a bounded operator does not imply that
exists. We will come back to this point at the end of the next subsection.
In 
B. Nonlinear Canonical Correlation
If the process y is not Gaussian, Eq. (1) is no longer valid. This motivates the nonlinear canonical correlation [Lar91] , [JW92a] , [Wu92] as a modified technique to reach the mutual information in the non-Gaussian setup. Precisely,
.., −1, 0, +1, ...} be a bounded valued weakly stationary process defined over the probability space (Ω, A, µ) . Let I(y − , y + ) be the mutual information between the past and the future and let Γ(·, ·) denote the canonical correlation. Then
(Ω, A, µ), E(f (y − )) = E(g(y + )) = 0, and for
can be made jointly Gaussian, in which case the joint past/future process is called diagonally equivalent to Gaussian.
To
It is easily found that
Clearly, the best choice of f, g is the one that maximizes T race
and it is readily seen that this is achieved for the same distortion functions f, g. This latter technique calls for the maximization of the
, as was done in the approach of Larimore and Baillieul [Lar91] , rather than the maximization of the mutual information, as done by Jonckheere and Wu [JW92a] , [Wu92] . Not surprisingly, by how much
can be increased by means of nonlinear distortion should be bounded by the mutual information; in fact, the following is true:
Theorem 2: Under the same assumnptions as Theorem 1,
and furthermore equality holds if and only if the processes y − , y + are independent.
Proof:
Using the above, it follows that
to be the mutual information rate. In case ι < 1 2 , the mutual information rate is too weak and will result in a nonvanishing MSE. It can be shown that, if the system is φ-mixing, the mutual information rate hence we choose polynomials p j (y − ), q j (y + ); j = 1, 2, ... such that E − p j = E + q j = 0, and forming bases of the Lebesgue spaces of zero-mean past-measurable, future measurable functions, respectively. Since
for least squares fitting coefficients φ ij , γ ij , the nonlinear CCA therefore reduces to
where φ, γ are the arrays made up with the coefficients φ ij , γ ij . The solution φ, γ is far from unique even under the normalization condition on f, g, because there is still the freedom to pre-multiply φ, γ by orthogonal transformations. If L < ∞, the above supremum is nontrivial and is easily accomplished via linear CCA of p (y − ) , q (y + ) , that is, via SVD of Γ (p (y − ) , q (y + )) .
Specifically, do the factorizations
along with the SVD
The coefficients of the optimal distortion functions are given by
Even when L < ∞, the Hilbert space basis will still be infinite-dimensional, so that the arrays φ, γ will be "fat." In this case, we have
In other words, the CCA of the Hilbert space basis (the right-hand side) provides a bound on what the nonlinear CCA can achieve (the left-hand side).
A feature that is already present in the linear CCA of traffic signals, but that becomes much more pronounced in the nonlinear CCA, is that the head of the CCC sequence, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , ..., σ D , remains close to one before dropping abruptly near zero. This phenomenon is, to our knowledge, unique to traffic signals and points to some deterministic features in the dynamics.
NUMERICAL REMARK: Practically, p, q are chosen as simple monomials or Chebyshev polynomials in the components of the past, future. It is important to scale the large powers appearing in p(y − ), q(y + ), for otherwise the high power terms become dominant over the low power terms.
IV. SIMULATION SETUP
We used the Network Simulator (ns)developed by LBNL to set up our simulation environment [httb] . Ns is a discrete event simulator widely accepted for networking research. It provides a substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local and satellite) networks. Moreover, ns generates Constant Bit Rate (CBR), TELNET, FTP, HTTP, etc. traffic. The simulator also has a small collection of mathematical functions that can be used to implement exponential, uniform, Pareto, etc. random variables. We used this capability to setup the network environment that A dynamical model for normal TCP traffic was synthesized from the signals obtained by sending HTTP traffic from the sources to the destinations at random times. For HTTP traffic, the file size distribution was modeled as a general ON/OFF behavior with a combination of heavy-tailed and light tailed sojourn times, while the inter-page time and the inter-object per page time distributions were set to be exponential. The page size was set to be constant and the object per page size to be Pareto to replicate today's network bursty traffic [PE95] , [LTWW94] . In summary, HTTP traffic can be parametrized by the following parameters in ns:number of sessions, inter-session time, session size, inter page time, page size, inter object time, average object size, and shape parameter of object size (exponent (α) in Pareto distribution).
In addition to this background (HTTP) traffic, a large number of small size CBR packets were sent over some UDP connections from model the attack scenario [CER] . CBR traffic can be parameterized by packet size and interval.
We ran several trials to cover a wide range of parameters for each topological setting. Each run was executed for 30000 simulated seconds, logging the traffic at the 0.01 second granularity.
V. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
In this section, we show how the mutual information changes under CBR attack. Three topologies are considered; parking lot topology, 50-node random topology, and 100-node transit-stub topology. For parking lot topology, we carried out two experiments. The first experiment gives an idea of how the mutual information is affected under the attack, while the second experiment shows how the attack can be detected at a link different than the attacked link. In a more complicated setting, we consider 50-node random topology. Moreover, to see if the mutual information is a useful tool in detection of infrastructure attacks, such as flooding a bottleneck link, we use 100-node transit-stub topology. 
A. Parking Lot Topology
1) Experiment 1: HTTP Traffic under CBR Attack; Monitored Link same as Flooded link; Linear versus Nonlinear Analysis:
In this experiment, the impact of intensity of traffic on the ability to detect an attack is explored. Here, the background traffic is HTTP and the attack traffic is CBR. Intensity of HTTP traffic can be varied by changing such parameters as number of sessions, number of pages, number of objects, etc. in ns( Table II) . The intensity of CBR traffic is also varied ( Table I ). The link under attack is 3-4 and the monitored link for the detection is also 3-4 in Figure 2 . The upper frames of Figure 3 show the linear mutual information for different sample intervals for normal and attack traffic. Note that the mutual information is derived from the average link utilization over the sample period (i.e., the number of byte that arrived during the sample period divided by the maximum possible number of bytes that could arrive during the sample period). Note that the mutual information for the normal traffic remains the same for different trials. The justification of the latter is that the mutual information is unchanged under scaling; it only depends on the dynamics, which in this case remains that of HTTP traffic. From trial 1 to trial 5, the intensity of HTTP traffic increases while the intensity of CBR traffic decreases. As the relative intensity of CBR traffic increases, the traffic becomes more predictable. This can be seen as the increase in the mutual information in the attack traffic.
Observe that for the trial 1, the increase in the mutual information under attack is small; the justification is the small amount of CBR traffic. Another experiment was performed in which the intensity of CBR traffic was kept constant. This experiment also showed a clear increase in mutual information under significant amount of CBR traffic.
The lower frames of Figure 3 shows the nonlinear mutual information for normal and attack traffic. Observe that for normal traffic the nonlinear mutual information is higher than the linear mutual information. Since TCP has complicated dynamics, higher correlation and hence higher mutual information is achieved by nonlinear distortion of the past and the future. This also holds true for the attack traffic. However, for this set-up, the relative increase in linear and non-linear mutual information remains almost the same.
2) Experiment 2: Monitored Link Downstream of the Flooded Link:
In this experiment, the flooded link is still 3-4, but the link utilization is monitored along link 4-5. The simulation set-up is the same as Experiment 1. The linear mutual information is computed for the link utilization 4-5. Figure 4 shows significant increase in the linear mutual information for the attack traffic as compared to the normal traffic. In conclusion, the mutual information can pick up the difference in the statistical structure of the signal, even when the signal is not recorded on the flooded link. This differs from count-based schemes that typically focus on observing the attack directly.
B. Random 50 Node Topology
In the more complicated "50-node" random topology ( 
C. 100 Node Transit Stub
CERT has noted that DoS attacks on links and routers are increasing [Cen] . A coordinated attack can be planted by many end hosts that all send packets that will eventually traverse the same link thereby hogging all link bandwidth. In the present experiment, we explore the possibility of detecting such an attack. A 100-node transit-stub topology is generated by Georgia Tech's topology generator (Gt-Itm). As shown in Figure 7 , there is only one HTTP server and 20 HTTP clients. There are 13 attack sources and 13 attack destinations. Each attack source sends 20 CBR flows to every attack destination. All the attack sources use bottleneck link 2-0 to send traffic. The focus here is the HTTP client that uses the link 0-2 to send HTTP requests and the link 2-0 to receive the HTTP server response. We ran 5 different trials by varying CBR and HTTP traffic parameters (see Tables III and IV) . Each trial was executed for 30000 simulated seconds, logging the traffic at 0.01 second granularity.
The monitored link is 2-0. a tta c k s ta rts a tta c k s ta rts a tta c k s ta rts
a tta c k s ta rts a tta c k s ta rts a tta c k s ta rts in the link utilization of the bottleneck link after the attack.
To detect this attack, we use the nonlinear mutual information computed for the link utilization observed on the bottleneck link 2-0. Figure 9 shows the mutual information plots for this experiment for different trials. It can be seen that there is a significant change in the mutual information, even though the attack cannot be seen by visual inspection of the link utilization plots. It is important to note that since the link utilization remains constant during the attack, count-based methods that simply consider the amplitude of the link utilization during a sample period are unable to detect the attack.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
To further investigate mutual information-based detection schemes, traces from a backbone link were used. Specifically, we The mutual information of the time series of the average link utilization over a 62 msec sample intervals was computed.
Based on the first 1000 samples, the nominal mutual information was determined. We denote this nominal value asĪ, whereas the mutual information found after processing a new observation is denoted I k . We take the lag to be 30 and compute the mutual information based on a window of 1000 observations. We employ the cumsum [BN93] technique to distinguish normal mutual information from abnormal mutual information. Specifically, an attack is declared when S k >Threshold, where S k+1 = max ¡ 0, S k + I k −Ī ¢ , with S 0 = 0. Figure 10 shows the time series of S before and during the UDP flooding attack.
The start of the attack can easily be observed by the sharp rise in S toward the end of the trial.
Clearly, the performance of the detection scheme is related to the value of Threshold. Figure 11 shows the relationship between the false alarm rate and Threshold. A false alarm is said to occur if S k exceeds Threshold. After a false alarm, S is reset to 0 and the time series is continued to be processed. As expected, as Threshold grows, the false alarm rate decreases. No false alarms occurred for threshold above 160, hence no points are included for Threshold> 160. However, as long as Threshold is below 1600, the attack is detected.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The investigations reported here have demonstrated that some specific attack scenarios, while perhaps not visible by naked eye observation of traffic plots, nevertheless create dynamical shift substantial enough for the mutual information to be affected in a sizable manner. It appears that the signal to be monitored is the link utilization at some link in the vicinity of the target of the attack. Results have shown that mutual information is especially useful in detecting flooding attacks such as CBR attacks. Other attacks, like SYN, which disrupts the normal sequencing of control and data packets, would require a distinction between control and data packets, which is left for further research. From a broader perspective, it appears that TCP traffic has a mutual information signature distinct from that of non-TCP traffic, so that any deviation, malicious or not, from TCP would be detectable. While the utility of mutual information has been demonstrated through simulations and experiments, further work is required to determine the performance under the wide range of traffic scenarios found in real networks.
